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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
HAL J. LANE, 
Respondent, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
8210 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent is in substantial agreement as to the 
material facts set forth by the appellant in the statement 
contained in his brief. These facts will be further discussed 
in connection with the argument of the respondent in sup-
port of the points contained herein.· 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE AD-
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DUCED BY THE STATE AS CORROBORA-
TION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCOM-
PLICES WAS INSUFFICIENT· AS A MATTER 
O·F LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT THE FACTS ADDUCED 
BY THE STATE DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
OFFENSE UNDER 76-27-7, U. C. A. 1953, AND 
DO NOT CONSTITUTE A FICTITIOUS CHECK 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6 TO THE JURY 
WHEREIN THE JURY WAS ADVISED AS TO 
ITS FUNCTION IN DETERMINING T·HE NE-
CESSITY AND EXTENT OF TESTIMONY IN 
CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE AD-
DUCED BY THE STATE AS CORROBORA-
TION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCOM-
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PLICES WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER 
O,F LAW. 
The conviction of the defendant as a principal for the 
offense charged in the information and indictment is based 
upon the provisions of 76-1-44, U. C. A. 1953, which pro-
vides in part : 
"All persons concerned in the commission of a 
crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether they 
directly commit the act constituting the offense or 
aid and abet in its commission or, not being present, 
have advised and encouraged its commission, * * * 
are principals in any crime so committed." 
The evidence adduced by the State showed the commission 
of the crime of issuing a fraudulent paper. In addition to 
a showing that such a crime had been committed, there was 
conclusively established the fact that the defendant was a 
party to the offense and, in fact, the primary instigator. 
The evidence disclosed the testimony of two accomplices 
together with sufficient corroborative evidence to support 
the conviction obtained in the lower court. The accom-
plices, Hanley and Clouse, testified in substantially the 
same manner as to the existence of a plan or scheme where-
by certain fictitious instruments had been made and uttered. 
The type and amount of corroborative evidence re-
quired to support the conviction is set forth in 77-31-18, 
U. C. A. 1953: 
"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony 
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other 
evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the 
testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the de-
fendant with the commission of the offense; and the 
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4 
corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely 
shows the commission of the offense or the circum-
stances thereof." (Emphasis added.) 
We particularly direct the court's attention to the language 
emphasized. An examination of the transcript discloses 
that sufficient evidence was adduced tending to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the crime of making and 
uttering a fraudulent paper. The defendant is charged 
with making and uttering the instrument designated in the 
transcript as Exhibit 2, this instrument having been passed 
at a Safeway Store in Sugar House, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The testimony of the accomplices disclosed that pursuant 
to the plan and scheme entered into between themselves 
and the defendant they did make and utter Exhibit 2, to-
gether with certain other instruments. The details of the 
plan and scheme developed as follows : Hanley opened the 
bank account in a fictitious name. Thereupon he, with the 
help and assistance of Clouse and the defendant Lane, and 
under the immediate direction of Lane, prepared the in-
struments with the felonious intent of defrauding third 
persons. The actual typing and signing of the instruments 
was done by the defendant. It was shown that one check 
was passed at Safeway Stores and that in connection there-
with groceries were purchased. A second check was passed 
at the Paris Company and in connection with this there 
was purchased a wallet. The testimony of the accomplices 
was to the effect that the acts were done and the purchases 
made under express instructions from the defendant. 
As corroboration of the accomplices' testimony it was 
shown that a wallet found in the possession of the defen-
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dant during his confinement in jail was one which had 
been identified by the accomplice as the same piece of 
merchandise as the accomplice had himself purchased at 
the request of th_e defendant and in connection with the 
passing of the fraudulent instrument. It would appear that 
where an accomplice states affirmatively that he purchased 
certain merchandise with a fraudulent instrument at the 
instruction of another (the defendant) and that thereafter 
the merchandise was found to be in the possession of the 
other, such possession serves to corroborate the accomplice's 
testimony. 
An examination of the signature card of the bank, 
Exhibit 1, shows that it has a different signature, dis-sim-
ilar in every respect from that appearing on the fraudulent 
instrument (Exhibit 2). Thus it is apparent that the ap-
plicant for the bank account (Hanley) did not alone make 
the check. This being the case, the finger of guilt must 
point to another person, as it does by reason of the testi-
mony of the accomplice as corroborated by the other wit-
nesses for the State. The appellant takes the position that 
the Paris Company incident can be shown only for the 
purpose of showing a course of action, scheme or plan, and 
that it is available for this purpose only upon the further 
showing that it was false or fraudulent. In support of this 
position appellant cites the case of People v. Nitzberg, 287 
N. Y. 183, 38 N. E. 2d 490, 40 N. E. 2d 40. In this same 
case, however, the court set forth a wide and variable rule. 
In the language of the court : 
"There is a princi pie-not so much a rule of 
evidence as a presupposition involved in the very 
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conception of a rational system of evidence * * * 
-which forbids receiving anything irrelevant, not 
logically probative." Thayer, Preliminary Treatise 
on Evidence, 264, 265. 
"It is not the law which furnishes the test of 
relevancy, but logic. Probative value, or capability 
of supporting an inference, is a matter of reasoning 
* * * and the rules of relevancy aim only to de-
termine whether a given fact is of sufficient pro-
bative value to be admissible at all." 1 Greenleaf on 
The Law of Evidence, Wigmore's 16th Ed., § 14. 
"For the purposes of the present case it is 
enough in the way of a definition of relevancy to 
say that a fact is relevant to another fact when the 
existence of the one renders the existence of the 
other highly probable, according to the· common 
course of events." See Sir James Stephen, Digest of 
the Law of Evidence, Chase's 2d Ed., Introduction 
XVIII. Cf. Platner v. Platner, 78 N. Y. 90, 94. 
While respondent does not dispute that the established rule 
of evidence to the effect that evidence of one crime may not 
be shown in corroboration of a separate offense, we feel 
that the rule may be more broadly stated. Evidence of one 
crime may not be shown to corroborate a second crime 
unless it may do so independently of the criminal elements 
contained in the separate offense. In other words, if the 
first crime is corroborative of facts adduced, regardless of 
whether or not such evidence is itself a separate offense, 
it should be admissible. 
As further evidence in support of the conviction of the 
defendant the state brought forth testimony of the arrest-
ing officer to the effect that at the time the defendant was 
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arrested there was found within the automobile, of which he 
was the sole occupant, several other checks (Exhibit 3). 
A comparison of these checks with the one subject of this 
prosecution discloses that all were similar in nature and 
were signed in the same hand. It is significant that just 
shortly before the arrest, the Safeway check was passed 
and, in connection therewith, as herein noted, groceries 
were purchased. Miscellaneous groceries were found in the 
automobile where the arrest was made. A third aspect to 
consider in determining whether or not there existed suf-
ficient corroboration is the testimony of the Mr. Andrus 
relating the fervent denial of any acquaintance by the de-
fendant with the accomplices (Tr. 98) and the subsequent 
contradiction wherein he admitted such an acquaintance 
(Tr. 99). This, too, would serve to strengthen the inference 
of guilt. 
The question of vvhat type and how much corroboration 
is necessary has been discussed by our Utah courts on many 
occasions. It has been said that the statute does not re-
quire corroboration in respect to every material fact but 
only in respect to such of the material facts as constitute 
the necessary element of the crime charged. The corrobo-
rated evidence need not be sufficient of itself to establish 
the guilt of the defendant but it must, in some degree, tend 
to implicate him in and connect him with the commission 
of the offense charged. State v. Spencer, 15 Utah 149, 49 
Utah 302; State v~ Collett, 20 Utah 290, 58 P. 684. It has 
been held that it is not essential that the corroborative 
evidence be sufficient of itself to support the verdict of 
guilt nor is it essential that the testimony of the accomplice 
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be corroborated on every 1naterial point. But it is suffi-
cient if the testimony of the accomplice· is corroborated as 
to some material fact and the corroborative evidence, in and 
of itself, and without the aid of the testimony of accom-
plices, tends to connect the defendant with the commission 
of the offense. State v. Lay, 38 U. 143, 110 P. 986; State 
v. Stewart, 57 U. 224, 193 P. 855; State v. Cox, 74 U. 149, 
277 P. 972, and cases cited were followed and approved in 
State v. Bruner~ 106 U. 49, 145 P. 2d 302. The facts and 
circumstances of the case, if sufficiently cogent, may con·· 
stitute corroboration. State v. Park, 44 Utah 360, 140 P. 
768. See also State v. Frisby, 49 U. 227, 162 P. 616; State 
v. Erwin, 101 U. 365, 120 P. 2d 285, and cases cited; State 
v. Petralia, ... U .... , 221 P. 2d 873. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT THE FACTS ADDUCED 
BY THE STATE DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
OFFENSE UNDER 76-27-7, U. C. A. 1953, AND 
DO NOT CONSTITUTE A FICTITIOUS CHECK 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LAW. 
The defendant Lane was properly charged with the 
commission of the crime of issuing a fraudulent instrument. 
The facts adduced· did properly set forth the necessary 
elements of the offense as prescribed by statute. The stat-
ute under which the defendant is accused· provides: 
"Every person who makes, passes, utters, or 
publishes, with intention to defraud any other per-
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son, or who, with like intention, attempts to pass, 
utter or publish, or who has in his possession, with 
like intent to utter, pass or publish, any fictitious 
bill, note or check, purporting to be the bill, note, 
check or other instrument in writing for the pay-
ment of money or property of some bank, corpora-
tion, partnership or individual when in fact there 
is no such bank, corporation, partnership or indi-
vidual in existence, knowing the bill, note, check or 
instrument. in writing to be fictitious, is punishable 
by imprisonment in the state prison for not less 
than one nor more than ten years." 
The position of the appellant is to the effect that he was 
not guilty of issuing a fraudulent paper but, in fact, and 
ironically enough, was merely doing business with an as-
sumed name. Such a position is not founded in fact nor in 
logic. We do not deny that Kevin Hanley assumed the name 
Walter Stevenson, but we submit that he did so under the 
direction of the defendant and with a pre-conceived intent 
to defraud. Hanley's testimony (Tr. 48 & 49) was as fol-
lows: 
"Q. What name, if any, did Mr. Lane tell you 
the account should be opened in? 
"A. Right at that time there wasn't any name. 
"Q. Did you subsequently open such an ac-
count, you, yourself? 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q .. Did Mr. Lane say anything to you with 
respect to how you were to open it, and in what name 
you were to open it? 
"A. Yes, he told me to open it in a business 
account, in the bank, in the name of Walter Stev-
enson. 
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"Q. Did you know anybody by the name of 
Walter Stevenson? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Had you ever used the name Walter Stev-
enson before? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. Have you used it since? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. Do you consider yourself as Walter Stev-
enson? 
"A. No sir." 
The accomplice, Hanley, by his own admission, assumed 
the name for the express purpose of defrauding third per-
sons. The name selected was fictitious in the mind of the 
accomplice and by inference must necessarily have been 
so in the mind of the defendant. Contrary to the position 
of the appellant, Walter Stevenson was a non-existent in-
dividual. He was not present in the,courtroom nor was he 
known to exist by any of the principals. The name Walter 
Stevenson was selected for the admitted purpose of com-
mitting a fraud. Appellant argues that a person may freely 
assume any name or such names as suit his desires or 
fancy. Such a rule is in every instance subject to the res-
ervation that no person may assume such a name with the 
intent to defraud others. Sec. 38 Am. Jur. 601. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6 TO THE JURY 
WHEREIN THE JURY WAS ADVISED AS TO 
ITS FUNCTION IN DETERMINING THE NE-
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CESSITY AND EXTENT OF TESTilVIONY IN 
CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES. 
The appellant takes exception to that part of the court's 
instruction number 6 which follows: 
"Under the law of this State a principal accused 
of crime cannot be convicted of such crime on the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. There-
fore, if you find in this case from the evidence that 
the witness Hanley was an accomplice in the com-
mission of the crime charged in the information, if 
you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt that such crime was committed, then you are 
instructed that you cannot convict the defendant on 
the testimony of Hanley, unless you further find 
that his testimony is corroborated by other evidence 
which in itself and without the aid of the testimony 
of said Hanley tends to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the offense." 
In addition, the appellant assigns as error the failure of 
the court to grant defendant's requested instructions num-
ber 1 and 2. The basis of their objection is that there 
exists by necessary implication the right of the jury to 
determine whether or not the witness Clouse and Hanley 
were accomplices. In effect, appellant's position is that the 
jury could determine, if they saw fit, that Hanley and 
Clouse were not accomplices and therefore could give undue 
weight to the witnesses' testimony without supporting cor-
roborative evidence. 
We submit that appellant's position is not sound and, 
in support thereof, direct the court's attention to instruction 
number 10, as follows: 
"These instructions are to be considered alto-
gether as a whole, and not as if each instruction 
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were a complete statement of the law by itself. And 
even though a rule, direction or thought is stated 
in different ways and. repeated in more than one 
instruction you should not give it undue importance. 
You should not single out any one sentence, point or 
instruction and give it undue emphasis and ignore 
others. But you should consider all of the instruc-
tions as a whole and apply them all to the evidence 
in the light of all of the instructions." 
By this instruction the jury was charged· with the obliga-
tion of considering all instructions given by the court in 
their proper light, weighing each one together and not as 
separate dis-organized statements of law. Having the fore-
going instruction in mind, the jury was further charged in 
instruction 6 as follows : 
"You are instructed· that all persons concerned 
in the commission of a crime, whether they directly 
commit the act constituting the offense or aid and 
abet in its commission, are principals in any crime 
so committed and are equally guilty of the commis-
sion of such crime. Likewise all persons concerned 
in the commission of a crime, whether they directly 
commit the act constituting the offense or aid and 
abet in its comn1ission, are accomplices, each to the 
other or others so engaged therein, and where two 
persons acting with a common intent jointly engage 
in the same undertaking and jointly commit an un-
lawful act each is an accomplice of the other in the 
commission of such unlawful act." 
The court then proceeded in the same instruction to in-
struct the jury in the language herein assigned as error. 
The jury properly performed their function as charged. 
It considered all of the instructions together as a body and 
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not as if each instruction were a complete statement by 
itself. The jury was properly advised as to what consid-
erations should be given to the status of the witnesses. The 
jury had heard the evidence and the admissions of the wit-
nesses. This knowledge, as it was interpreted by the in-
struction number 6, should and undoubtedly did sufficiently 
advise the jury of the law. The fact that the court used 
the language "if you find in this case from the evidence 
that the witnesses Hanley and Clouse were accomplices" 
does not open the door to prejudicial error. The jury had 
been advised as to what constituted an accomplice. They 
had heard the testimony of the witnesses and were in an 
informed position to determine for themselves that the 
witnesses were accomplices. The requested instructions 
were granted in substance, if not in the entirety. Such being 
the case no prejudice resulted to the defendant from the 
instruction given or from the failure of the court to give 
the instructions requested. See Patterson v. State, 279 P. 
356, 44 Cr. 64. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence adduced 
In this case does support the verdict rendered, that the 
verdict is in full compliance with law, and that no error 
prejudicial to the defendant was committed by the court. 
The verdict should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
EARL S. SPAFFORD, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
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